Nehru's 97 Major Blunders Page 5

  The role of Mountbatten in the integration of the three states that created problems—Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K—was dubious. Where the British interests were not affected—in respect of the other Princely States—he did try to help India. But, where the British interests clashed with the Indian interests, he helped the British interests. Mountbatten attempted to also refer the Junagadh and the Hyderabad cases to the UN. Fortunately, they were firmly rejected by Sardar Patel. British did all that was possible to prevent Indian army action in Hyderabad.

  Nehru was mainly responsible for having Mountbatten appointed as the GG of independent India; and was perhaps the only factor in making him the Head of the Defence Committee.

  Wrote Durga Das in ‘India from Curzon to Nehru & After’: “...Patel added that Nehru was unduly amenable to Mountbatten’s influence. Nehru had ‘always leaned on someone’. He was under Bapu’s protective wing and ‘now he leans on Mountbatten’.”

  Was Edwina’s influence on Nehru also a factor? Maulana Azad, a pro-Nehru person, expresses bewilderment in his autobiography as to how a person like Jawaharlal was won over by Lord Mountbatten; mentions Nehru’s weakness of being impulsive and amenable to personal influences, and wonders if the Lady Mountbatten factor was responsible.

  Blunder–11 :

  Refusing J&K Accession when Offered

  Maharaja Hari Singh had first offered J&K’s accession to India in September 1947. Had the accession been accepted, the Indian army could have been deployed in Kashmir well in advance of the invasion by the Pakistani-raiders, preventing both the creation of the PoK, and the terrible tragedy of loot, killings and rapes.

  Inexplicably, Nehru refused the accession! He first wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as the prime minister of the State. That was not acceptable to the Maharaja. Was it not queer? Rather than the state agreeing to merge, it was the nation being favoured with accession that was laying down conditions! Absurdity unlimited! But, that was Nehru!!

  In sharp contrast you had Jinnah offering a signed blank sheet along with his own fountain pen to Maharajas of Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner to put down their conditions for accession to Pakistan, saying: “You can fill in all your conditions.”

  States Narendra Singh Sarila in ‘The Shadow of the Great Game’: “Mountbatten added: ‘He [Patel] has also attacked Nehru for the first time saying “I regret our leader has followed the lofty ideas [Lofty or silly! And, certainly against the national interests.] into the skies and has no contact left with earth or reality”’...This outburst probably reflected Patel’s frustration with Nehru at the time, for refusing to accept the Maharaja of Kashmir’s accession to India unless and until a government under Sheikh Abdullah was installed.”

  It was undemocratic and irresponsible of Nehru, and an illegal act, not to have obtained the concurrence of the cabinet before taking such a major decision of not accepting J&K accession. It is quite likely that Mountbatten had dissuaded him from accepting accession, as the British wanted J&K to accede to Pakistan.

  Blunder–12:

  Allowing Kashmir to be almost Lost

  The Pakistani raiders were almost on the outskirts of Srinagar by 22 October 1947, and Maharaja desperately sought help. Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed sending the Indian Army to J&K.

  However, Mountbatten insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India (the offer earlier refused by Nehru, most likely at the instance of Mountbatten himself!), India should not send army to Kashmir, and Nehru concurred.

  On Friday, 24 October 1947, the Pakistani raiders attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar.

  Defence Committee of India, headed by Mountbatten, met the next morning on Saturday, 25 October 1947, and rather than ordering action to save Srinagar, directed VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw and a few senior military officers to fly to Srinagar the same day to check the position first hand. Why shouldn’t Nehru as head of the government have insisted on immediate relief for Kashmir?

  This was actually a deliberate ploy of Mountbatten to pass time and not allow counter-action by India, and let Pakistan gain an upper hand by force, as the British desired—because Mountbatten would have known through the British C-in-C of the Pakistani army as to what Pakistan was up to.

  VP Menon and company flew to Srinagar and found the state of affairs to be worse than what was reported. They advised Hari Singh to hurry to the safety of Jammu. MC Mahajan, the premier of J&K, VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw, and colleagues returned to Delhi from Srinagar early next morning on Sunday, 26 October 1947, and reported the desperate situation to the Defence Committee.

  They advised that it would not be possible to save Srinagar and its people unless the troops were immediately air-lifted. Even the Srinagar air-strip was in danger of being imminently occupied by the raiders, in which case even that only possibility of air-lifting troops would close.

  Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that unless help was sent immediately, both the Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar would be butchered by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be lost to Pakistan, Mountbatten still insisted that the Instrument of Accession be first signed in favour of India. Nehru simply went along with his guru Mountbatten.

  It didn’t seem illegal to Mountbatten and Nehru that the raiders backed by the Pakistani army should invade J&K, which had not signed any Instrument of Accession in Pakistan’s favour; but it seemed illegal to them to send Indian army help to save people getting looted, raped and butchered!

  As desired, VP Menon flew to Jammu the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—to have the Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh, which he did.

  The Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh on 26 October 1947, and brought back by VP Menon, was accepted by Mountbatten on 27 October 1947. With the signing of the Instrument and its acceptance, J&K legally became a part of India, and it became incumbent upon India to defend its territory, send in its army and throw out the raiders.

  Yet, in the Defence Committee meeting held on Monday, 27 October 1947, Mountbatten—serving the pro-Pakistani British interests—tried to stall sending the Indian army, saying it was too late, raiders being already at the door of Srinagar. But, who made it late in the first place—Mountbatten himself! As usual, Nehru prevaricated. Even when the need for action could not be postponed any further, Mountbatten threw his weight against any precipitate action, and the service chiefs [all British] backed him. They all sought to dissuade Nehru and other Indian leaders from an airlift on the grounds that it involved great risks and dangers.

  Sardar Patel finally intervened. Recounted Sam Manekshaw, who later became the first Field Marshal in the Indian army:

  “At the morning meeting he [VP Menon/Patel] handed over the (Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport. As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He [Nehru] said, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he [Patel] said ‘Please give your orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started flying in troops...”

  Had Sardar Patel not acted, and had it been left to Nehru and Mountbatten, the whole of Kashmir would have been lost to Pakistan.

  Sardar Patel made his first visit to Srinagar around 3 November 1947. Commented pro-Nehru and anti-Patel Sheikh Abdullah: “Events took a decisive turn after Patel’s visit. The Sardar did not lose even one minute. He studied the situation and said that the enemy
must be driven back.”

  Blunder–13 :

  Unconditional J&K Accession Made Conditional

  Was the ‘Instrument of Accession’ signed by Maharaja Hari Singh for J&K different from other Princely States, and did it incorporate some special provisions? NO.

  The Instrument of Accession was standard and common for all Princely States. There was no provision in it for any ruler to add or subtract conditions. It was required to be signed unchanged.

  With regard to J&K, it is worth re-emphasising that (a)the Instrument of Accession signed was no different from those signed by the other Princely States; (b)it was signed by Hari Singh unconditionally; and (c)it was accepted by the Governor General, Lord Mountbatten, unconditionally. That is, the whole process was no different from the one that applied to the other 547 Princely States that acceded to India.

  Through a separate letter, however, Mountbatten advised Maharaja Hari Singh that the accession was subject to reference to the people of J&K. The Maharaja had put no such condition.

  In fact, even Sheikh Abdullah, who had favoured accession to India, never insisted on this condition—rather, he wanted it to be unconditional, lest any uncertainty should remain.

  It was Mountbatten who wrote a separate letter to Hari Singh advising that the accession was temporary, and was conditional upon ascertaining the wishes of the people of Kashmir.

  Who gave Mountbatten the authority to write such a letter? Who was he to make the accession conditional? Was he still the Viceroy of the British India serving the British interests, or was he the Governor General of independent India? Why did Nehru not object?

  Why had the Indian leaders, particularly Nehru, not made it clear to him that he could not act on his own on critical matters—that he had to take the permission of the cabinet? When the other 547 states acceded to India, did he write such a letter to each of them or put this condition?

  One can understand conditions being stipulated by the party offering you the favour of accession. That is, the Maharaja stipulating conditions for his accession to India—however, he stipulated no conditions! But, for the party being favoured with accession to stipulate conditions—that’s absurd! Why should India have put conditions upon J&K for its accession? Was India doing a favour to J&K for allowing it to accede to India?

  Had it been a Governor General who was an Indian like say Dr Ambedkar or Dr Rajendra Prasad or Rajagopalachari or Mahatma Gandhi (Wonder why he didn’t wish to take on any official responsibility after independence, and leave the top post to a British!) himself, and not a British like Mountbatten, would he have tried to make the accession conditional? And, had he done so, would the Indian public have ever forgiven him?

  Or, was it that Nehru acquiesced to writing of such a letter by Mountbatten? (—yet another blunder?) Even if the deed was done without Nehru’s knowledge (unlikely), Nehru should have objected to it and should have got it annulled or withdrawn.

  However, that separate letter of Mountbatten certainly did NOT make the Instrument of Accession conditional, because there was no provision in the Instrument for any conditions. Signing of the Instrument and its acceptance by the then Indian governor-general made the accession of J&K full, final and irrevocable.

  India should have stuck to this incontestable legal position of the irrevocable accession of J&K to India, like for the other 547 states, on the strength of the signing of the Instrument of Accession. Even US considered ours as an ironclad legal position in 1948. However, Mountbatten and Nehru spoiled the case.

  Blunder–14 :

  Internationalisation of the Kashmir Issue

  Nehru single-handedly created the J&K problem (guided by, and at the prodding of Lord Mountbatten), and rather than solving it, made it more complicated. The problem still bedevils us and costs us tremendously in money, material and men.

  He unnecessarily internationalised what was purely an internal issue by taking it to the UN, again under the influence of the British Mountbatten.

  Writes V Shankar in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel, Volume 1’: “Lord Mountbatten persuaded Pandit Nehru to make a broadcast in which he was to announce that the accession would be subject to a plebiscite under the UN auspices. This was scheduled at 8.30pm on 28 October. Sardar used to insist on seeing the texts of important broadcasts including those of the prime minister. Pandit Nehru had a very busy day and could not send the text before 8.15pm. Sardar read it and noticed the embarrassing commitment. He tried to contact Pandit Nehru but the latter had left for the Broadcasting House. Sardar then commissioned me to go to the Broadcasting House and ask Pandit Nehru to delete the offending phrase 'under UN auspices'...” However, by the time Shankar reached the place, the Mountbatten-inspired deed was done by Nehru.

  It was imprudent, illegal, and totally undemocratic on the part of Nehru to have made this commitment of “plebiscite under UN auspices” at the instance of a British, Lord Mountbatten, having his own axe to grind, without taking the Indian Cabinet into confidence!

  Wrote the veteran Congressman DP Mishra: “…Soon after, I heard Nehru’s voice on All India Radio at Nagpur, committing the Government of India to the holding of plebiscite in Kashmir. As from my talk with Patel, I had received the impression that the signature of the Maharaja had finally settled the Kashmir issue. I was surprised by Nehru’s announcement. When I visited Delhi next, I pointedly asked Patel whether the decision to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir was taken at a meeting of the Cabinet. He sighed and shook his head. It was evident that Nehru had acted on Mountbatten’s advice, and had ignored his colleagues.”

  It seems that Nehru, the claimed expert on international affairs, was innocent about the functioning of the UNSC—UN Security Council. He was apparently under the impression that UNSC functioned on the basis of the high ideals enshrined in the UN Charter and looked to the merits of the cases referred to it. That the member-nations of the UNSC acted in their own selfish national interests and engaged in power-game was apparently not known to the foreign-affairs expert Nehru.

  Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were against, however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in his radio broadcast on 2 November 1947. Incidentally, plebiscite was held in Junagadh also, but it was conducted by India itself on 20 February 1948, managed by an Indian ICS officer, CB Nagarkar—as arranged by Sardar Patel.

  Despite sane advice, Nehru scored a self-goal for India by formally referring the J&K matter to the UN on 1 January 1948. With the issue internationalised, India suffered greatly, both domestically and internationally. It became like the sword of Damocles. And continues to be so! The UK, the US and their allies, led by the UK, began playing politics of favouring Pakistan over India, ignoring the fact of Pakistani aggression in J&K.

  As usual, Nehru himself realised his blunder after the act. Nehru regretted the Kashmir issue “has been raised to an international level… by reference to the Security Council of the UN and most of the great powers are intensely interested in what happens in Kashmir… [Kashmir issue] has given us a great deal of trouble… the attitude of the great powers has been astonishing. Some of them have shown active partisanship for Pakistan… We feel we have not been given a square deal.”

  Blunder–15 :

  Inept Handling of the J&K Issue in the UN

  India and Pakistan presented their cases at the UN. The Indian case in the UN was very ineptly presented in January, 1948 by Gopalaswami Aiyangar, Minister for Kashmir Affairs, specifically appointed for the purpose by Nehru in his cabinet.

  Sardar Patel was opposed to Gopalaswami Aiyangar leading the team. He considered him to be not competent enough. Patel had instead suggested CP Ramaswami Iyer, aka just CP—a very competent intellectual, statesman and diplomat, with many foreign contacts in the UK and the US. But, Nehru ignored Patel’s advice.

  Quipped Chaudhury Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), the Pakistani representative in the UN, when he learnt that India’s representative was Aiyangar: “You
are offering me Kashmir on a platter.”

  Here is a tell-tale description of what happened in the UN. It is from the book ‘Sir CP Remembered’ by Shakunthala Jagannathan:

  “I was a student living in New York, when the question of Kashmir came up in the U.N. Accompanied by several Indian and American friends, I attended the Security council session, oozing with confidence on India’s stand. First came Sir Zafrullah Khan’s impassioned and brilliant speech on behalf of Pakistan which was powerful enough to shake up our confidence.

  “When he sat down, we Indians breathed a sigh of relief. The Indian delegation was then asked to present their case. The delegate concerned [Gopalaswami Aiyangar] put up his hand, stood up, and said, ‘I protest!’… We had expected that our case, so much stronger, would shake up the U.N.! Instead our presentation on that day resulted in a debacle, right before our eyes...”

  It is worth noting that Zafrullah Khan had an illustrious career. Educated at London’s King’s College, he was the foreign minister of Pakistan (1947-54), the president for the UN General Assembly (1962), and the judge (1954-61, 1964-73), vice-president (1958-61) and the president (1970-73) of the International Court of Justice. He sat on the British Viceroy's Executive Council as its Muslim member between 1935 and 1941. He represented India at the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939. He was the Agent-General of British India to China in 1942.

  Gopalaswami Aiyangar, chosen by Nehru (and opposed by Sardar Patel), was no match for Zafrullah Khan. Expectedly, while Zafrullah Khan’s presentation was brilliant, and received all-round praise, that of Aiyangar’s was an unmitigated disaster!