Nehru's 97 Major Blunders Read online

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  Jinnah’s bitter reaction on 26 July 1937 to Nehru’s unjust act was: “What can I say to the busybody President [Nehru] of the Congress? He [Nehru] seems to carry the responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and must poke his nose into everything except minding his own business.” The fissure caused by Nehru’s impetuosity was never healed.

  Blunder–3 :

  Scoring Self-Goal—Resignations of Ministries in 1937

  For 1937 elections, and installation of the Congress ministries in provinces please see details in the previous ‘blunder’ (Blunder-2).

  In view of the British declaration of war (in WW-II) on behalf of India without consulting the Congress it was decided at the CWC meeting at Wardha on 22-23 October 1939 not to co-operate with the British in the war, and that the Congress Provincial Governments would resign by the month-end in protest. The move was spear-headed by Nehru and the leftists.

  The hard-won (thanks mainly to the efforts of Sardar Patel) Congress ministries in the provinces since 1937, under the strict vigilance of Patel, had begun to perform better than expected. To guide and coordinate the activities of the provincial governments, a central control board known as the Parliamentary Sub-Committee was formed, with Sardar Patel, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rajendra Prasad as members.

  A number of measures in the interest of the general public had been taken. Many Congress ministers set an example in plain living. They reduced their own salaries. They made themselves easily accessible to the common people. In a very short time, a very large number of ameliorative legislations were pushed through in an attempt to fulfil many of the promises made in the Congress election manifesto.

  Emergency powers acquired by the provincial governments through the Public Safety Acts and the like were repealed. Bans on illegal political organizations such as the Hindustan Seva Dal and Youth Leagues and on political books and journals were lifted. All restrictions on the press were removed. Securities taken from newspapers and presses were refunded and pending prosecutions were withdrawn.

  The blacklisting of newspapers for purposes of government advertising was given up. Confiscated arms were returned and forfeited arms licenses were restored. In the Congress provinces, police powers were curbed and the reporting of public speeches and the shadowing of political workers by CID agents stopped. Another big achievement of the Congress Governments was their firm handling of the communal riots.

  The success rankled both with Jinnah, and the British: they never wanted the Congress to get popular. Besides, it reduced the British dependence on the provinces under the Congress rule to mobilise resources for the WW-II. Both for the British and for Jinnah it was therefore “good riddance”.

  The worst effect of the resignations was on NWFP. This overwhelmingly Muslim province (95%) was ruled in conjunction with the Congress by the Khan brothers. It was a show-piece for the Congress, and a negation of all that Jinnah and the Muslim League stood for—majority Muslim province under the Congress. Resignation by the ruling Congress-Khan brothers was god-sent for Jinnah and the British. Both quickly manipulated to install a Muslim League government, and make popular the divisive agenda.

  In the Pakistan that the British had planned inclusion of NWFP was a must, and that was only possible if the Congress and the Khan-brothers were dislodged. Linlithgow even instructed the then Punjab Governor Sir George Cunningham to render all necessary assistance to Jinnah to facilitate installation of a Muslim League government.

  Viceroy Linlithgow had been playing a dangerous and irresponsible divisive game in India’s North-West, particularly in Punjab and NWFP that ultimately led to the Partition carnage, and he can’t be absolved of the responsibility, along with several top British leaders, including Churchill.

  Wrote VP Menon in ‘The Transfer of Power in India’: “Had it [Congress] not resigned from the position of vantage in the Provinces the course of Indian history might have been different… By resigning, it showed a lamentable lack of foresight and political wisdom. There was little chance of its being put out of office; the British Government would surely have hesitated to incur the odium of dismissing ministries which had the overwhelming support of the people. Nor could it have resisted an unanimous demand for a change at the Centre, a demand which would have been all the more irresistible after the entry of Japan into the war. In any case, it is clear that, but for the resignation of the Congress, Jinnah and the Muslim League would never have attained the position they did…”

  It was like giving up all the gains of the 1937-elections; and passing them on to the then defeated Muslim League. This self-emasculation by the Congress not only greatly weakened it and drastically slashed its bargaining position, it threw the Congress into wilderness, and led to the rise of the Muslim League, separatism, and ultimately partition.

  Jinnah couldn’t help calling it the ‘Himalayan blunder’ of the Congress, and was determined to take full advantage of it. Jinnah and the Muslim League went to the extent of calling upon all Muslims to celebrate 22 December 1939 as the “Deliverance Day”—deliverance from the “misrule” of the Congress. Thanks to Nehru’s blunder, the stars of the Muslim League began to rise.

  However, ignoring the adverse consequences of getting out of the government at that stage, Nehru threatened in 1939 to pull out from ministries in various provinces, in response to the British declaration of war on behalf of India without consulting the Congress—something the British would have only welcomed!

  Nehru took a stand that “friendship between India and England is possible but only on equal terms”. Further, India could not fight for freedom of others when it was itself unfree. All that tall talk was fine if the Congress had the strength to impose its will, and be capable of being enough of a nuisance for the British to stand up and take notice. But, when the British perceived the Gandhian methods as no threat at all, where was the need for them to heed? Nehru should have realised that the Gandhian Congress was a pleader for freedom, and not a fighter for freedom. Pleaders can plead. But, they can’t dictate terms.

  “Internationalist” Nehru, though vociferously most anti-fascist and anti-Nazi, advocated rabidly anti-British stand in the wake of the British declaration of war against Germany on 3 September 1939 on behalf of India. Curiously, being more a socialist and a communist sympathiser than an “internationalist”, Nehru changed his tune soon after Russia joined the war in 1941 on the side of Britain, and against Nazis!

  Patel and Gandhi were not in favour of non-cooperation with the British in the war, and of the ministries resigning; but Nehru & Co—the leftists—insisted upon it. The resignations were effectively a victory of the Congress Left.

  It was a big blunder—a political suicide. The responsibility for this great act of folly rested with Nehru and his socialist supporters. Nehru had begun committing blunders well before independence; while after independence it was a torrent of Nehruvian blunders that ensured India failed to rise from its centuries of slavery and remained a third-rate, third-world country, even as nations much behind it at the time of independence raced ahead and joined the first-world.

  Blunder–4 : Leg-up to Jinnah

  Resignation of the Congress ministries in 1939 was welcomed both by Jinnah and the British authorities.

  Jinnah and the Muslim League went to the extent of calling upon all Muslims to celebrate 22 December 1939 as the “Deliverance Day”—deliverance from the “misrule” of the Congress. Jinnah took full advantage of it, and his stars and that of the Muslim League rose. 1939 was the watershed. 1939-onwards Muslim League was on the ascendency, even as the clout of the Congress eclipsed.

  It is worth noting that Nehru and the Congress were unnecessarily too obsessed with the Centre and the Central legislature, where Jinnah was able to play a wrecker. Had the Congress continued in its ministries, and had it played its cards well in the provinces in the Muslim-majority areas, they could have derailed Jinnah.

  The Unionist Party headed by Sikandar Hyat Khan that ruled Punjab was a
Muslim-Hindu-Sikh coalition. The Krishak Proja Party headed by Fazlul Huq, a nationalist Muslim, dominated Bengal. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah had formed a Hindu-Muslim coalition in Sind, independent of the Muslim League. If the Congress had intelligently coordinated its efforts with these parties, it could have sidelined Jinnah.

  But, what to speak of doing that ground work and strengthening its ties with the non-MuslimLeague Muslim parties, the Congress itself chose to get eclipsed by giving up its ministries, thanks to Nehru’s decision.

  Congress opposition to the British declaration of World War-II on behalf of India, its non-cooperation with the British in that regard, and the unconditional, whole-hearted support extended to the British by Jinnah and the Muslim League ensured the rise of the Muslim League and the gradual eclipse of the Congress, so much so that thereafter it were the British, Jinnah and the Muslim League who dictated the terms of independence, Partition and Pakistan.

  Blunder–5 :

  Assam’s Security Compromised

  With the annexation of Assam by the British in 1826, British brought in the peasantry from the over-populated East-Bengal for tea plantation and other purposes. The Muslim League, in order to dominate the predominantly non-Muslim Assam and the Northeast, and make it yet another Muslim-majority region, strategized back in 1906 in its conference at Dacca to somehow increase the Muslim population in Assam, and exhorted the East-Bengal Muslims to migrate and settle in Assam. The fact of large-scale migration was also noted in the Census report of 1931. Congress leaders Bardolai, Medhi and others raised this serious issue of migration, but did not get due support from the Congress leadership at the Centre.

  In 1938, when a Muslim League-headed coalition fell in Assam, Netaji Subhas Bose favoured a bid by the Congress to form a government. Several Congress leaders were opposed to the idea, particularly Maulana Azad. Sardar Patel backed Subhas Bose fully; and finally a Congress ministry led by Gopinath Bordoloi took office. With Bordoloi in office it was hoped that the Muslim migrations would be stemmed, and the game of the Muslim League would be defeated.

  However, thanks to the unwise move of Nehru and his left supporters, the Congress ministries in the provinces resigned in 1939 (please see details under Blunder-3). This forced Gopinath Bordoloi to also resign in Assam, although Netaji Subhas Bose and Patel wanted Bordoloi government to continue. This was God-sent, rather Allah-sent, for the Muslim League. Pro-British Sir Syed Mohammad Saadulla of the Muslim League, from whom Bordoloi had wrested power, again took over. With the Congress in limbo on account of the unwise surrender of power in the provinces, followed by the imprisonment of its leadership in 1942 Quit India, Saadulla ruled uninterrupted for the next seven years shoring up the Muslim base in Assam.

  Saadulla brought in a Land Settlement Policy in 1941 that allowed immigrants (Muslims) from East Bengal to pour into Assam, and hold as much as 30 bighas for each homestead. He boasted to Liaquat Ali Khan that through his policies he had managed to quadruple the Muslim population in the lower four districts of the Assam Valley.

  In short, the demographic position became much worse in Assam thanks to the wrong decision of Nehru.

  When we talk of the Northeast we must first pay our tributes to Gopinath Bordoloi (whom Nehru ignored, and who got Bharat Ratna much later when the non-Dynasty government was in power) but for whom Assam and the Northeast may not have been part of India.

  The initial British Plan of 1946 for the Indian Independence clubbed Assam and Bengal together in Group-C. Such an inclusion would have had the consequence of Assamese being in a minority, to be overruled into ultimately being absorbed in East-Pakistan. Sensing this ominous possibility, Bordoloi opposed being clubbed into Group-C, contrary to what Nehru had agreed to.

  With Nehru remaining unamenable, Bordoloi started mass agitation. He fought the Muslim League’s effort to include Assam and other parts of the Northeast Region (NER) in East Pakistan. The Congress Party at the national level, led by Nehru, would have acquiesced to the Muslim League had it not been for a revolt by Bordoloi, backed by the Assam unit of the Congress Party and supported by Mahatma Gandhi and the Assamese public.

  Blunder–6 :

  Undemocratic Elevation as the First PM

  Post 1945, with the increasing hopes of the imminence of India’s independence, all patriots looked forward to having a strong, assertive, competent, decisive, no-nonsense person as India’s first prime minister, who would bring back the lost glory of India, and turn it into a modern, prosperous nation. Iron Man was the clear choice, being a cut much above the rest. And, nobody looked forward to having some undemocratic, indecisive, clueless sissy to mess up a hard-won freedom after centuries.

  The Congress Party had practically witnessed Patel as a great executor, organizer and leader, with his feet on the ground. Sardar had demonstrated his prowess in the various movements and assignments, including that in the Nagpur Agitation of 1923; the Borsad Satyagraha of 1923; excellent management of the Ahmedabad Municipality during 1924-27; tackling of the Ahmedabad Floods of 1927; the Bardoli Satyagraha of 1928 that earned him the title of "Sardar"; the Dandi March and the Salt Satyagraha of 1930; successful management of elections for the Congress during 1934-37; preparation, conduct and management of Haripura session of the Congress in 1938 on a massive scale; building up of the party machine; role in preparation for the Quit India Movement; and premier leadership role from 1945 onwards.

  Patel’s achievements were far in excess of Nehru’s, and all Congress persons and the country knew it. The far greater contribution of Patel in the Quit India Movement, unmatched by Nehru, was fresh in the mind of the Congress leaders and public.

  Sardar was far better academically, and much more intelligent than Nehru. Like Nehru, Sardar Patel too had studied in England. But, while Nehru’s father financed all his education, Sardar financed his own education in England, through his own earnings! While Nehru could manage to scrape through in only a poor lower second-division in England, Sardar Patel topped in the first division!

  Professionally too, Sardar was a successful lawyer, while Nehru was a failure. Sardar had a roaring practice, and was the highest paid lawyer in Ahmedabad, before he left it all on a call by Gandhi; while Nehru was dependent upon his father for his own upkeep, and that of his family.

  Based on the ground-level practical experience since 1917, it could be said with certainty in 1946 that Nehru was no match for Sardar for the critical post of the prime minister. Of course, Nehru as PM in practice confirmed beyond a shred of doubt that it should have been Sardar, and not him, who should have been the first PM of India. For details, please read the author’s other books ‘Foundations of Misery: The Nehruvian Era 1947-64’ (available on Amazon).

  ~~~

  Whoever became the president of the Congress in 1946 would have also become the first prime minister of India, hence the presidential election was critical.

  The Pradesh Congress Committees (PCCs), 15 in number, alone had the power to nominate and elect a president. Gandhi had indicated his preference for Nehru 9 days before the last date of nomination of 29 April 1946, on which date the Congress Working Committee (CWC) met to consider the nominations sent by PCCs.

  Result: Not a single PCC nominated Nehru! 12 of the 15 PCCs (80%) nominated Sardar Patel. 3 of the 15 PCCs (20%) did not nominate anyone. It was therefore a non-contest. Sardar Patel was the only choice, and an undisputed choice.

  But, was Sardar Patel chosen? No! It was a case of déjà vu—a repeat of 1929. Gandhi asked Patel to withdraw. Patel complied without a protest or delay. That cleared the ground for Nehru.

  “I sent a paper round proposing the name of Jawaharlal [at the instance of Gandhi, when Gandhi observed no one had proposed Nehru, even though such nomination (other than by PCC) was illegal]… It was certain that if Jawaharlal’s name had not been proposed, the Sardar would have been elected as the President… The Sardar did not like my intervention. I have since wondered if, as the General Secretary, I should have been in
strumental in proposing Jawaharlal’s name in deference to Gandhi’s wishes in the matter… But who can forecast the future? On such seemingly trivial accidents depends the fate of men and even of nations.”

  —Acharya Kriplani

  Finding none had recommended Nehru, reportedly, Gandhi did tell Nehru: “No PCC has put forward your name…only [a few members of] the Working Committee have [that too at the prodding of Gandhi himself].” Nehru remained pregnantly silent. Despite his grand pretentions of Gandhi as his father figure, and he being his son, chela and follower, Nehru remained silently defiant and let it be known to Gandhi he would not play second fiddle to anyone.

  It has even been claimed that Nehru tried blackmail: he threatened to split the Congress on the issue. It appears that all the “sacrifice” for the nation by Motilal and his son was geared to ultimately grab power for the Nehru dynasty!

  Nehru was not without shrewdness or guile; like Franklin D Roosevelt, he had something of the lion and the fox in him and none understood better the mechanics and manipulations of Indian politics.

  —Frank Morass

  Gandhi was a dictator. He was no democrat. And, it was not as if his dictatorial and undemocratic action did any good for the nation. It actually cost the nation dear. Rather than national interests, Gandhi’s personal bias dominated. Commented Dr Rajendra Prasad: “Gandhi has once again sacrificed his trusted lieutenant for the sake of the glamorous Nehru.”